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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1970

No. 964

JACK VAN SICKLE,
Petitioner,

v.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1970

No. 984

JACK VAN SICKLE,
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THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
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On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
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PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

The petitioner, JACK VAN SICKLE, without waiving or modifying in any way his reliance on all matters contained in his Petition for Certiorari, hereby replies to arguments first raised in the Attorney General's opposing brief:

POINT ONE: STATUTORY SILENCE IS NOT STATUTORY CLASSIFICATION

Instead of focusing on the issues raised by the facts in this case, the Attorney General crosses his eyes and points finally at the general proposition that legislative bodies are empowered to make reasonable classifications of bailable offenses. This will not do. The Legislature of the State of Nevada has never classified persons held under executive warrants of extradition as being disentitled to invoke Nevada's constitutional and statu-

tory provisions on bail. All the shouting, so to speak, is because petitioner is entitled to bail under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, under Article 1, §7, of the Nevada Constitution, under applicable Nevada statutory provisions on bail and habeas corpus, and under the evidentiary determination of the trial court in habeas corpus proceedings admitting petitioner to bail; but, petitioner has been deprived of the equal protection of these constitutional provisions and laws by the judicial determination of a majority of the justices of the Nevada Supreme Court that the courts of Nevada have no power to admit to bail any person held under an executive warrant of extradition.

There is no merit to the Attorney General's contention that legislative silence constitutes a denial of a right to bail. The same argument was raised in TRIMBLE v STONE, U.S., D.C., Dist.Col., 1960, 187 F.Supp. 483. There it was contended a juvenile could not be enlarged on bail pending trial because the Juvenile Court Act for the District of Columbia made no provision therefor. Judge Holtzoff's opinion in that case, upholding the right of bail, states:

> "It is argued in opposition to the petition that there is no provision for bail in the Juvenile Court Act for the District of Columbia, and that the pertinent statute * * * authorizes the Court either to release the juvenile in the custody of a parent, guardian, custodian or probation officer; or else to cause him to be detained in such place of detention as shall be provided by the Bureau of Public Welfare. True, the Juvenile Court Act is silent on the subject of bail. The higher law of the Constitution, however, prevails. The Eighth Amendment is self-executing and no statute is necessary to implement it. It should be noted that there is no provision in the statute denying the right to bail. The Act is merely silent on this subject. A serious Constitutional question would arise if the statute expressly or by necessary implication denied the right

to bail.

"It is clear, therefore, that this issue cannot be determined by a construction of the Juvenile Court Act. The problem must be solved solely on the basis of the Constitution, namely, whether the constitutional right to bail applies in this instance. If it does, this privilege must be accorded to this petitioner. * * * "

The court in *Trimble v Stone*, supra, also noted the fact that juvenile proceedings were denominated "civil" rather than "criminal," but this artificiality was disposed of by the recognition that "basic human rights do not depend on nomenclature." In holding that the juvenile had a constitutional right to bail, Judge Holtzoff stated:

"The Court recognizes that it may be desirable in the interest of the public, or even in the interest of the individual, in some instances to confine the accused while awaiting final disposition of his case, instead of permitting him to be liberated on bail. These considerations are as applicable to some adult offenders as to juveniles. Yet the Constitution forbids this result. It is far more important to preserve the basic safeguards of the Bill of Rights, which were developed as a result of centuries of experience, than it is to sacrifice any one of them in order to achieve a desirable result in an individual case no matter how beneficial it may seem to be for the moment. Immediate myopic vision must not be permitted to interfere with a long range view of the protection of personal liberty."

POINT TWO: THE RIGHT OF BAIL, AND THE POWER TO ADMIT TO BAIL, ARE NECESSARY COMPONENTS OF AN UNHAMPERED, INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL DETERMINATION ON PROBABLE CAUSE IN EXTRADITION

The argument, implicit in the comments of the Attorney General's opposing brief, that the people get their rights from

government is as old and as wrong as the history of the abuse of power.

This nation was founded on the proposition that the government gets its power from the people; to make assurance doubly sure, the Bill of Rights guarantees that certain rights of the people, including the right of bail, shall be free from abuse by the government.

The central, vital necessity of an independent judiciary to compel obedience to the Bill of Rights is manifest in extradition cases. Thus, the right to an independent judicial review of probable cause is commanded by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, KIRKLAND v PRESTON (C.A., Dist.Col., 1967) 385 F.2d 670, SAYNE v SHIPLEY (C.A. 9th, 1969) 418 F. 2d 679, and incorporated in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Nevada Revised Statutes, §179.197.

The importance of this right is documented in IN RE KAINE (1852) 55 U.S. 103, 14 How. 103, 14 L.Ed. 345, where the Court considered our extradition treaty with Great Britain and the Act of 1848 whereby Congress referred foreign powers to the judiciary for extradition warrants and commitments. The opinion by Justice Catron recites the history of Johnathan Robbins:

In 1799, Robbins was arrested as a fugitive for murder in the British fleet. He was imprisoned under a warrant of the District Judge of South Carolina and had been confined six months when the Secretary of State addressed a letter to the Judge mentioning that application had been made by the British Minister to the President for the delivery of Robbins under Jay's Treaty. The letter said: "The president advises and requests you to deliver him up." On this authority, Robbins was brought before the District Court on habeas corpus and the judge ordered his surrender to the British consul or his agent.

Robbins was delivered to a detachment of federal troops stationed there to aid in the surrender and they delivered him to an officer of the British navy waiting to receive Robbins on a vessel of war, in which he was carried away. There was never any dispute that the judge acted by order of the President, in aid of the executive department. The act of the executive was defended on the ground that Jay's Treaty was a compact between nations which must be executed by the President throughout, at least until Congress gave the courts or judges power to act in the matter. A resolution impeaching the President's conduct was brought in the House of Representatives, where the President was defended by John Marshall, later Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The people, however, opposed the doctrine of single action by the President. The opinion in *In re Kaine*, supra, states:

> "* * * But a great majority of the people of this country were opposed to the doctrine that the President could arrest, imprison and surrender a fugitive, and thereby execute the Treaty himself; and they were still more opposed to an assumption that he could order the courts of justice to execute his mandate, as this would destroy the independence of the judiciary, in cases of extradition, and which example might be made a precedent for similar invasions in other cases; and from that day to this, the judicial power has acted in cases of extradition, and all others, independent of executive control."

The effect of this popular opposition on the Treaty of 1842 with Great Britain, and Congress' Act of 1848 whereby a judicial determination is interposed between the acts of executives in extradition, is described in *In re Kaine*, supra, as follows:

> "That the eventful history of Robbins' case had a controlling influence on our distinguished negotiator, when the Treaty of 1842 was made; and especially on Con-

gress, when it passed the Act of 1848, is, as I suppose, free from doubt. The assumption of power to arrest, imprison, and extrude, on executive warrants, and the employment of a judicial magistrate to act in obedience to the President's commands, where no independence existed or could exist, had most materially aided to overthrow the administration of a distinguished revolutionary patriot, whose honesty of purpose no fairminded man at this day doubts. Public opinion had settled down to a firm resolve, long before the Treaty of 1842 was made, that so dangerous an engine of oppression as secret proceedings before the executive, and the issuing of secret warrants of arrest, founded on them, and long imprisonments inflicted under such warrants, and then, an extradition without an unbiassed hearing before an independent judiciary, were highly dangerous to liberty, and ought never to be allowed in this country. Congress obviously proceeded on this public opinion when the Act of 1848 was passed, and therefore referred foreign powers to the judiciary when seeking to obtain the warrant, and secure the commitment of the fugitive; and which judicial proceeding was intended to be independent of executive control, and in advance of executive action on the case. * * * "

The complete and independent exercise of judicial power in habeas corpus encompasses the right to maintain judicial custody over the person of a petitioner in habeas corpus, and to admit him to bail. WRIGHT v HENKEL (1903) 190 U.S. 40, 23 Sup.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948; ARTUKOVIC v BOYLE (D.C., Cal., 1952) 107 F.Supp. 11, rev'd on other grounds (CA 9th) 211 F.2d 565, cert den. 348 U.S. 818, 99 L.Ed. 698, 75 S.Ct. 202.

This right was exercised in this case by the order of the trial judge admitting the petitioner to bail. This right, and the equal protection of the laws, have been denied petitioner by the act of the majority of the justices of the Nevada Supreme Court, and certiorari should be granted to vindicate that right and reinstate the order admitting petitioner to bail.

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PETITION

FOR

REHEARING

IN THE

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PETITION FOR REHEARING

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THE DENIAL OF CERTIORARI OVERLOOKS A SITUATION OF COMPELLING EMERGENCY AND NATIONAL MAGNITUDE IN INTERSTATE EXTRADITION.

Since the consideration of the original petition for certiorari herein, Petitioner's counsel have discovered a source of statistics dealing with the national impact of interstate extradition, and have further discovered a federal-court conflict on the question of admission to bail in extradition cases.

Due consideration of these data and additional authorities shows that a problem of national magnitude is *at this moment* on the doorstep of the federal courts, where there is already a sharp conflict of opinion on the right of admission to bail for persons in petitioner's situation.

FEDERAL COURT CONFLICT

BROWN v FOGEL, CA 4th, 1967, 387 F2d 692, *certiorari denied*, 490 U.S. 1045, 88 SCt 1647, 20LEd2d 307, approved

the action of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in admitting the petitioner to bail on his own recognizance pending a proceeding in the state courts of Virginia testing the validity, in habeas corpus, of an executive warrant by the Governor of Virginia commanding petitioner's rendition to stand charges in the State of Maryland, and upholding the condition of that bail that petitioner remain in the general custody of his attorney in New York except for necessary absences connected with litigation against petitioner.

On the other hand, a person in exactly the same situation in Mississippi, but whose habeas corpus challenge to the extradition warrant was itself pending in federal court, was denied bail during the pendency of the proceeding in WALDEN v MOSLEY, N.D., Miss, DC, 312 FSupp 855, decided on May 1, 1970.

The contrariety of opinion in these federal court decisions is not attributable to statutory provisions. Virginia adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act by Laws, 1940, ch. 305; Code 1950, §§ 19.1-49 to 19.1-80, which is silent on the question. Mississippi's provision on extradition (Miss. Code, 1942 Ann., §3981) is also silent on the matter. Attached hereto as Appendix A is a table of the jurisdictions in which the uniform legislation has been adopted, including 46 states and 2 territories. (The only states which have not adopted the uniform law are: Mississippi; North Dakota; South Carolina; and Washington.)

NATIONAL INCIDENCE OF INTERSTATE EXTRADITION

During the year 1969, Miss Marilyn Pochop, the Extradition Secretary to the Governor of the State of Nevada, polled the several States to determine the number of demands made and received in interstate extradition for the year 1968. Her compilation of figures is attached hereto as Appendix B.

Examination of this compilation reveals the following:

1. Thirteen states did not respond to the poll.

2. Thirty-seven states reported a total of 5,198 demands for extradition made in 1968.

3. Thirty-seven states reported receiving in 1968 a total number of 4,488 requests for extradition made upon those states as asylum states.

4. Each of the reporting states, during the year 1968, made an average number of demands for extradition upon other states in the sum of 140.48.

5. If this average number of demands for extradition is applied to the 13 non-responding states, then a total projected figure of 7,024 is obtained for all extradition demands made by 50 states in just one year, 1968.

Miss Pochop further reports by a letter attached hereto as Appendix B annual increases in the incidence of extradition usage in Nevada as follows:

STATE OF NEVADA	DEMANDING	ASYLUM
1968	190	250
1969	231	275
1970	211	285

Undoubtedly, the increases shown for Nevada in the years 1969 and 1970 and would be paralleled by increases in all other states for those periods and for 1971.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Surely, this study establishes that we are talking about a matter affecting thousands and thousands of people in this country every year.

Surely, also, we are talking about a matter the determination of which is the direct responsibility of this court.

As early as the decision in EX PARTE KENTUCKY v DENNISON (1860) 24 How. 66, 16 LEd 717 (opinion by Chief Justice Taney) it was held the Extradition Clause was so important to the federal system of government that basic issues thereunder could not be left to be determined according to the attitude and interpretation of the several states, but that the clause must have a plain and definite construction, lest the clause serve as a constant source of controversy and irritating discussion between the states.

As late as the decision in PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v O'NEILL (1959), 349 US 564, 79 SCt 564, 3 LEd2d 585, certiorari was granted to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida (100 So.2d 149) that the "Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings" violated the United States Constitution. In delivering the opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter states:

> ". . . We granted certiorari . . . (omitting citation) inasmuch as this holding brings into question the constitutionality of a statute now in force in forty-two States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. . . "

It cannot seriously be considered that the impact of uniform legislation on interstate rendition of witnesses in criminal proceedings has anything approaching the impact of interstate rendition of fugitives. How is it, then, that the Court has reviewed constitutional issues under uniform legislation which, at best, affects only a handful of people a year, and yet today refuses to review direct constitutional issues arising under legislation affecting thousands and thousands of people in this country every year?

Before leaving the case of PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v O'NEILL, supra, it should also be noted that one of the grounds of challenge to the "Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a

State in Criminal Proceedings" was that the act violated the Due Process Clause by failing to make any provision for bail. This Court stated as to that issue:

> " . . . The Circuit Court of Dade County ruled that the absence of any provision for bail in the procedure of apprehension and delivery violated due process of law. Since the Supreme Court of Florida expressly refrained from ruling whether the failure of the statute to provide for bail for persons attached and delivered violated either the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.Const. Declaration of Rights, §9, or the Fourteenth Amendment, and *since silence on bail is not tantamount to proscription of bail, the claim that this silence of the statute is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is a hypothetical question* which need not now be considered. We may add that the sole claim before us, as it was the sole claim dealt with by the Supreme Court of Florida, is that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. No claim is before us that the administration of the statute in the particular circumstances of this case violates due process." (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the question which was hypothetical in PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v O'NEILL, supra, is now real — that the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada construing the "Uniform Criminal Extradition Act" deprived petitioner of his constitutional right of bail. The question is squarely presented by the present petition; the question is one of magnitude under the federal Constitution and national impact in the federal courts as well as the courts of the several states. The question cries out for resolution by this Court.

If the question be not resolved by this Court, what will be the effect on Petitioner? He has again been incarcerated in the jail of Washoe County, Nevada, where he must fight out

the issues of probable cause without the benefit of bail which is available to all others before conviction. During this time he could apply to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada for admission to bail (as was done in BROWN v FOGEL, supra). If bail be denied there (as it might well be in deference to the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada), then petitioner may again be confronted with the necessity of running the gamut of courts to preserve the issue of bail and obtain definitive resolution of the question. Petitioner is a responsible and reliable man in his community and his state, but the abilities and resources of any man may be so strained by incarceration that he will be coerced to forego his constitutional rights. The petitioner has now entered the "low visibility" zone of criminal process where this Court should act, as it did in SIBRON v STATE OF NEW YORK (1968) 392 US 40, 88 SCt 1889, 20 LEd2d 917, stating:

> "Many deep and abiding constitutional problems are encountered primarily at a level of 'low visibility' in the criminal process — in the context of prosecutions for 'minor' offenses which carry only short sentences. We do not believe that the Constitution contemplates that people deprived of constitutional rights at this level should be left utterly remediless and defenseless against representations of unconstitutional conduct. A State may not cut off federal review of whole classes of such cases by the simple expedient of a blanket denial of bail pending appeal. . . . "

ABUSE OF POWER OF EXTRADITION

All instruments of power, however much they may be intended to be used for the promotion of humanity, can, nevertheless, be misued as instruments of oppression. The instrument of interstate extradition is no exception, particularly where use of the instrument is coupled with an absence of bail. This was most recently illustrated in the case of PEOPLE EX REL. BOWMAN v WOODS (Ill. Supreme Court, 1970)

264 NE2d 151. Thomas Bowman plead guilty to complaints of cow stealing in Alabama (ten cows of different ownership were involved in a single transaction). In 1951 Bowman was sentenced to imprisonment of a year and a day for each separate offense. He began serving his sentence on May 5, 1951, and a little over a year later, on August 28, 1952, Bowman escaped from a prison farm and fled to Illinois. In 1955, Bowman was arrested on a gambling charge in Illinois and it was learned he was wanted in Alabama as an escapee. A fugitive warrant was issued and Bowman was retained in custody. Hearings on the fugitive complaint were continued five times on motion of the State. Alabama had been duly notified to begin extradition proceedings but informed the State's Attorney in Illinois that Alabama had no desire for Bowman's return; so, on August 12, 1955, on motion of the State of Illinois, the fugitive complaint was nol-prossed and Bowman was released. Then, in March 1957, over a year and a half later, Bowman was again arrested under a warrant issued by the Governor of Illinois at the request of the Governor of Alabama. Bowman started habeas corpus proceedings because of inaction on the part of Alabama and when Alabama failed to take further action to facilitate extradition, Bowman was discharged from custody some three months later on June 18, 1957. Then, after a lapse of eleven years, in May 1968, Bowman was arrested a third time under warrant of the Governor of Illinois made at the request of the Alabama Governor. Bowman again filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied by the lower court in Illinois, but granted by the Illinois Supreme Court. The court stated:

> "In this case there was an unexplained 13-year delay between the first extradition proceeding in 1955 and the last effort in 1968. During this period the State of Alabama knew of Bowman's presence in Illinois and twice refused to extradite him. *As a consequence, because he has been unable to make bail, petitioner has been imprisoned*

in Illinois on three occasions pending disposition of the extradition proceeding. We believe that the circumstances of this case require an application of the concept of fundamental fairness, as expressed in many appeals. . . . " (Emphasis supplied.)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Petitioner, and many thousands of others similarly situated annually, are being denied their constitutional rights of bail, the equal protection of the laws and due process of law under a heterodoxy of state and lower federal court opinion as to the requirements of the Extradition Clause and the power of the judiciary in habeas corpus.

These constitutional issues arise in the field of interstate extradition — a field classically considered to be basic to orderly federal criminal administration.

Certiorari has readily been granted by this Court to review constitutional issues arising under the "Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings" — an area of miniscule national impact in comparison with the impact of the "Uniform Criminal Extradition Act."

Refusal to grant certiorari relegates petitioner and all others desiring to challenge the validity of extradition by habeas corpus to the coercion of imprisonment under a rule of geography instead of a rule of justice under constitutional law.

The Court is hereby called upon to exercise its highest duty as the guardian of constitutional rights, and also its more immediate and perhaps humbler task as a conscientious housekeeper over federal criminal administration.

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UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACTS
STATES OF ADOPTION

Alabama	Code of Ala., Tit. 15, §§ 48-67, 69-74.
Alaska	AS 12.70.010 to 12.70.290.
Arizona	A.R.S. §§ 13-1301 to 13-1328.
Arkansas	Ark. Stats. §§ 43-3001 to 43-3028.
California	West's Ann.Pen.Code, §§ 1548 to 1556.2.
Colorado	C.R.S. '53 60-1-1 to 60-1-29, 60-2-1 60-2-5.
Connecticut	C.G.S.A. §§ 54-157 to 54-185.
Delaware	11 Del.C. §§ 2501 to 2530.
Florida	F.S.A. §§ 941.01 to 941.30.
Georgia	Code, §§ 44-401 to 44-429.
Hawaii	R.L.H.1955, §§ 250-1 to 250-27.
Idaho	I.C. §§ 19-4501 to 19-4527.
Illinois	S.H.A. ch. 60, §§ 18-49.
Indiana	Burns' Ann.St. §§ 9-419 to 9-448.
Iowa	I.C.A. §§ 759.1 to 759.29.
Kansas	KSA 62-727 to 62-757.
Kentucky	KRS 440.150 to 440.420.
Louisiana	Code Crim.Pro., arts. 261 to 280.
Maine	15 M.R.S.A. § 201 et seq.
Maryland	Code 1957, art. 41, §§ 16-43.
Massachusetts	M.G.L.A., c. 276 § 11-20R.
Michigan	M.C.L.A. §§ 780.1-780.31.
Minnesota	M.S.A. §§ 629.01 to 629.29.

Missouri	V.A.M.A. §§ 548.011 to 548.300.
Montana	R.C.M.1947, §§ 94-501-1 to 94-501-32.
Nebraska	R.R.S.1943, §§ 29-729 to 29-758.
Nevada	N.R.S. §§ 179.177 to 179.235.
New Hampshire	RSA 612:1 to 612:30.
New Jersey	N.J.S.A. 2A:160-6 to 2A:160-35.
New Mexico	1953 Comp. §§ 41-19-1 to 41-19-30.
New York	McKinney's Crim.Code, §§ 827 to 859.
North Carolina	G.S. §§ 15-55 to 15-84.
Ohio	R.C. §§ 2963.01 to 2963.29.
Oklahoma	22 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 1141.1 to 1141.30.
Oregon	ORS 147.010 to 147.280.
Panama Canal Zone	6 C.Z.C. §§ 5021 to 5050.
Pennsylvania	19 P.S. §§ 191.1 to 191.31.
Rhode Island	Gen.Laws 1956, §§ 12-9-1 to 12-9-35
South Dakota	SDC 34.1701 et seq.
Tennessee	T.C.A. §§ 40-1001 to 40-1034.
Texas	Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. art. 51.13.
Utah	U.C.A.1953, 77-56-1 to 77-56-28.
Vermont	13 V.S.A. §§ 4941 to 4969.
Virgin Islands	5 V.I.C. §§ 3801 to 3829.
Virginia	Code 1950, 19.1-49 to 19.1-80.
West Virginia	Code, §§ 5-1-7 to 5-1-13.
Wisconsin	W.S.A. 964.01 to 964.29.
Wyoming	W.S.1957, §§ 7-27 to 7-53.

Appendix A

STATE	DEMANDING	ASYLUM
ALABAMA	No Response	
ALASKA	No Response	
ARIZONA	145	150
ARKANSAS	No Response	
CALIFORNIA	800	400
COLORADO	No Response	
CONNECTICUT	No Response	
DELAWARE	No Response	
FLORIDA	250	250
GEORGIA	140	185
HAWAII	2	58
IDAHO	100	50
ILLINOIS	225	200
INDIANA	100	100
IOWA	58	39
KANSAS	232	145
KENTUCKY	140	110
LOUISIANA	No Response	
MAINE	18	8
MARYLAND	160	175
MASSACHUSETTS	20	100
MICHIGAN	190	200
MINNESOTA	40	60
MISSISSIPPI	No Response	
MISSOURI	200	200
MONTANA	70	30
NEBRASKA	50	30

Appendix B

STATE	DEMANDING	ASYLUM
NEVADA	190	250
NEW HAMPSHIRE	25	13
NEW JERSEY	No Response	
NEW MEXICO	75	50
NEW YORK	100	250
NORTH CAROLINA	200	100
NORTH DAKOTA	20	12
OHIO	No Response	
OKLAHOMA	120	130
OREGON	200	140
PENNSYLVANIA	No Response	
RHODE ISLAND	20	130
SOUTH CAROLINA	No Response	
SOUTH DAKOTA	35	15
TENNESSEE	350	150
TEXAS	403	429
UTAH	45	55
VERMONT	No Response	
VIRGINIA	165	26
WASHINGTON	110	120
WEST VIRGINIA	100	100
WISCONSIN	85	18
WYOMING	15	10
TOTAL	5,198	4,488

Appendix B

STATE OF NEVADA
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUPREME COURT BUILDING
CARSON CITY, NEVADA 89701

ROBERT LIST
ATTORNEY GENERAL

March 5, 1971

Harry Claiborne, Esq.
Attorney at Law
108 S. Third
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Dear Mr. Claiborne:

Sorry I was unable to get these figures out to you yesterday, but I was unable to get to the project before this morning.

Records show for 1969, Nevada requested 231 extraditions from other states and received 275 requests from other states. In 1970, Nevada requested 211, and received requests from 285 states.

I hope this is the information you need.

Sincerely,

Marilyn Pochop
Extradition Secretary

Appendix C